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THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU: FINANCIAL REGULATION FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*
Leonard . Kennedyt Patricia A. McCoytt & Ethan Bernsteintt-
After existing regulatory systems failed to prevent the recent financial
crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, a sweeping reform designed to alleviate the crisis and prevent
its recurrence. Out of this Act, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
was born. This new agency is charged with making markets for consumer
financial products and services work for Americans, a task that was previ-
ously spread out among seven different federal agencies with varying priori-
ties. This Article describes, with a series of concrete case studies, four key
principles that have guided the Bureau as it strives to fulfill Congress's man-
date. First, the Bureau has taken a market-based approach that reflects its
belief in the power of markets and competition to produce increasingly better
outcomes for consumers and responsible providers alike. Second, recognizing
that understanding a market well is essential to effective regulation, the Bu-
reau has relied on evidence-based analysis to inform all of its activities.
Third, the Bureau has complemented its empirical analysis with input from
all segments of the public-including consumers, advocates, and regulated
entities. To facilitate the kind of robust public participation that will make
for more effective regulation, the Bureau has employed innovative technolo-
gies and strong transparency policies. Finally, the Bureau has studied and
learned from historic regulatory experiences and has adopted best practices
from the public and private sectors. These four principles, and others which
cascade from them, define the Bureau's twenty-first century approach to pro-
moting a well-functioning market for consumer financial services and effec-
tive consumer protection.
* While every effort has been made at accuracy, this Article should not be relied
upon as a legal reference.
t General Counsel, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. B.A., 1974, and J.D.,
1977, Cornell University. Member of the Washington, D.C. and Maryland Bars.
tt Connecticut Mutual Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law and
former Assistant Director, Mortgage Markets, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
ttt Chief Strategy Officer, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; Doctoral Candi-
date, Harvard Business School; and Kauffman Foundation Fellow, Harvard Law School;
A.B. Amherst College, 1998; J.D. and M.B.A., 2002, Harvard University.
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INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF BUILDING AN ENDURING
CONSUMER AGENCY
The recent financial crisis, the worst since the Great Depression,
was partly the result of federal regulatory failure. The consequences
were catastrophic. Congress responded by passing the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
which included the creation of a new regulatory agency charged with
ensuring that "all consumers have access to markets for consumer fi-
nancial products and services" that are "fair, transparent, and compet-
itive."1 Congress consolidated in this new agency consumer financial
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act or
Dodd-Frank), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
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protection functions that previously were spread across seven federal
agencies and provided the new agency with important new authority
and responsibilities for consumer financial protection.
Building this new agency-the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB or the Bureau)-has been no small job. As described
by Raj Date, the Bureau's Deputy Director, "What we're doing is in
roughly equal measures a startup and a post-merger integration. And,
we are doing both of those things at the same time [that] we are trying
to undertake a pretty strategic overhaul over how this basic enterprise,
protecting consumer financial services, is done."2
The Bureau has sought to approach the historic challenge it faces
deliberatively-with full appreciation for the gravity and difficulty of
the work before it. The Bureau strives to be an agency that will help
consumer financial markets work by making rules more effective, by
consistently and fairly enforcing those rules, and by enabling consum-
ers to take more control of their economic lives. This Article explains
how the CFPB has approached building an agency that will achieve
these goals.
Through a series of concrete case studies describing the Bureau's
startup activity across a range of functions-from rulemaking and en-
forcement to consumer education and outreach-this Article shows
how the CFPB has begun to give life to its statutory obligations
through four core principles: (1) a market-based approach, (2) a fo-
cus on evidence-based analysis, (3) a commitment to encouraging and
enabling robust public participation through transparency and inno-
vative uses of technology, and (4) a recognition that history and other
agencies' experience can provide invaluable guidance. By following
these core principles, the Bureau seeks to achieve its mandate.
Part I of this Article provides a brief background of the CFPB. It
describes the crisis that inspired the creation of this new consumer
agency as well as the Bureau's legislative mandate, progress so far, and
structure. Part II then elaborates on the four core principles noted
above that guide the CFPB's approach to meeting its statutory respon-
sibilities. Finally, Part III provides four concrete examples of how the
agency has employed these core principles in practice. Although
these four case studies by no means show the full breadth and depth
of the Bureau's work, they do provide insight into how the Bureau has
integrated the principles into its activities.
2 Tim Fernholz, What Startups Can Learn from a Bootstrapping Government Agency,




BORN IN CRISIS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CFPB
A. The Financial Crisis
The Bureau was born out of the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression. The crisis, which pushed the financial system into
great distress in September 2008 following the unraveling of Bear
Stearns, the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the near collapse of AIG and
other firms, had devastating consequences. As a result of the crisis,
home values plunged, personal savings fell, millions of people lost
their jobs, and millions of consumers defaulted on their mortgages
and other loans.3
The damage was not confined to those who became delinquent
due to unaffordable loans. The housing market crash sparked by the
crisis also harmed homeowners able to pay their mortgages whose
home values fell and neighborhoods declined. 4 Consumers struggled
to obtain credit as banks tightened their lending standards. Retirees
saw their retirement funds drop precipitously. Workers saw their posi-
tions eliminated as employers struggled to make ends meet.5 Small
businesses suffered greatly as credit contracted and consumer de-
mand fell. Providers of financial services and products saw their earn-
ings fall and share prices plunge. The distress was widespread and
severe. Many of the problems sparked by the crisis persist years later,
as housing prices remain depressed in many areas and the economy
continues to recover. 6
The fact that many Americans took on loans that they did not
understand and ultimately could not afford undoubtedly worsened
the crisis. While some borrowers consciously assumed too much debt,
3 See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FI-
NAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 233-410 (2011) (illustrating in detail the events that led to
the financial crisis).
4 For an overview of the housing downturn, see JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2011 (2011), available at http://
www'jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/state-nation's-housing-201 1.
5 For a summary ofjob loss, see News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Worker Displacement: 2007-2009 (Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/disp.nr0.htm.
6 See Economic Outlook and Recent Monetary Policy Actions: Hearing Before the Joint Econ.
Comm., 112th Cong. 1-2 (Oct. 4, 2011) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve System) [hereinafter Economic Outlook], available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20111004a.pdf.
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many others were misled by confusing loans.7 The regulatory system
prior to Dodd-Frank failed to protect consumers from such abuses.
This failure was not surprising. During the period leading up to
the crisis, federal oversight of consumer finance was a patchwork
spread out among seven different agencies.8 None of these agencies
had the jurisdiction and tools necessary to ensure that consumer fi-
nancial markets functioned well, and important sectors of these mar-
kets operated without any meaningful federal oversight. 9 Moreover,
consumer financial protection was not a central task for any of the
federal banking agencies, whose principal mission was ensuring the
safety and soundness of financial institutions.1 0 The fragmentation in
regulatory structure made policy coordination difficult."'
This regulatory apparatus was simply not up to the task of re-
sponding to new products offered in the midst of the dramatic growth
in lending. Some lenders took advantage by issuing increasingly com-
plex credit products that entailed significant hidden costs and risks
for consumers. 12 Many consumers struggled to make sense of these
ever more complicated products.13 Ultimately, the ineffective regula-
tory system failed to protect the market for consumer financial ser-
vices and the stability of the U.S. economy. Neither the extent nor the
ramifications of this problem were exposed fully until the financial
crisis.
B. Creation of the Bureau
In June 2009, President Obama proposed to address these fail-
ures by consolidating consumer financial protection responsibility in
one agency. 14 Just over one year later, with the passage of the Dodd-
7 See generally KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoy, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECK-
LESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011) (providing a detailed account of
the issues underlying the subprime mortgage crisis).
8 See Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252, 57,252 (Sept. 20, 2010).
9 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
95-97 (2008).
10 See id. at 86-87.
11 Private sector firms similarly face high costs when coordinating among fragmented
entities. For this reason, private sector firms integrate functions internally rather than
purchasing them on the open market. Private firms may integrate functions when the
"transaction cost" created by contracting for such functions on the market becomes too
great. For the seminal description of transaction cost economics, see R.H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). The situation is admittedly somewhat different
in the case of government agencies, but the transaction costs of interagency coordination
can similarly justify integrating authority within one agency.
12 For an overview of the survey evidence, see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 9, at
26-58.
13 Id. at 11-20.
14 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDA-
TION; REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 55-62 (2009), available at http:/
/www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport-web.pdf (proposing the creation
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Frank Act, Congress created the CFPB as an independent agency
within the Federal Reserve System to regulate consumer financial
products and services. The Bureau assumed responsibilities and au-
thorities from seven other federal agencies on July 21, 2011,15 and
President Obama appointed Richard Cordray as its first Director in
January 2012.16
The Dodd-Frank Act tasks the CFPB with helping consumers ob-
tain the information needed to make informed and responsible finan-
cial decisions, protecting consumers from harmful practices and
discrimination, eliminating outdated and unnecessary regulations,
consistently and evenhandedly enforcing federal consumer financial
law to promote fair competition, and increasing market trans-
parency.17 Congress gave the CFPB six basic tools to achieve these
goals: examination and supervision, enforcement, rulemaking, con-
sumer education, collecting and responding to consumer complaints,
and researching and monitoring consumer financial markets.18
In giving the Bureau this broad mandate, Congress gave the Bu-
reau many important authorities and transferred functions relating to
consumer financial protection from other agencies to the Bureau. 19
For instance, Congress gave the Bureau authority to take action
against unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices in the con-
sumer financial marketplace, including through rulemaking. 20 Con-
of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency); President Barack Obama, Remarks by
the President on the Economy at Georgetown University (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-economy-georgetown-university
(announcing financial reform as a "new foundation for growth and prosperity"). This idea
was derived from Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren's recommendation for a new federal
agency to protect consumers in the financial marketplace. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra
note 9, at 1-2 (making "a case, supported by both theory and data, for comprehensive
safety regulation of consumer credit").
15 Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252, 57,252-53 (Sept. 20, 2010) (setting
July 21, 2011 as the date on which "certain authorities will transfer from other agencies to
the CFPB, and the CFPB will be able to exercise certain additional, new authorities under
the [Consumer Financial Protection] Act and other laws").
16 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama An-
nounces Recess Appointments to Key Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012), available at
h ttp: / /www.whi tehouse.gov/ the-press-office/ 201 2/01 /04/ presiden t-obama-announces-
recess-appointments-key-administration-posts.
17 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
18 Id. § 5511(c).
19 Pursuant to section 1062 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Treasury Secretary designated
that these functions would transfer to the Bureau on July 21, 2011. See Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1062(c)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2040 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5582(c) (1)); Designated Trans-
fer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252-53. The Bureau colloquially refers to this as its "launch
date," even though it was vested with and exercised certain other authorities before that
date. See, e.g., Learn About the Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumer
finance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (listing the Bureau's accomplishments
as ofJuly 21, 2011).
20 12 U.S.C. § 5531.
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gress also assigned the Bureau the responsibility of supervising certain
nonbank firms offering consumer financial products and services, 2 1
an important market segment that had previously not been subject to
federal supervision. In particular, Congress gave the Bureau the au-
thority to conduct examinations of and require reports from nonbank
entities including mortgage originators, brokers, and servicers; private
student lenders; payday lenders; "larger participant[s]" in markets for
other consumer financial products and services; and other covered
entities determined to pose risk to consumers. 22 This supervisory au-
thority will enable the Bureau to work with nonbank entities to cor-
rect violations and provide redress where appropriate. When
necessary, the Bureau may also take legal action to enforce "[f] ederal
consumer financial law,"23 including against nonbank entities. The
Dodd-Frank Act also makes the Bureau's Director a member of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Board of Directors, 24 the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council,25 and the Finan-
cial Stability Oversight Council.2 6 By giving the Bureau a seat at these
tables, Congress recognized that a consumer-oriented perspective can
help preserve the safety and soundness of financial institutions and of
the financial system as a whole and that safety and soundness mea-
sures can have implications for consumers.
At the same time, Congress also transferred the responsibility for
protecting consumers in the financial marketplace from other regula-
tors to the Bureau. Notably, Congress gave the Bureau the authority
to supervise certain depository institutions that other regulators his-
torically had supervised for compliance with federal consumer finan-
cial law.27 In particular, the Bureau is tasked with supervising banks,
thrifts, and credit unions with total assets of over $10 billion, as well as
their affiliates, for compliance with federal consumer financial laws. 28
Currently, these large institutions total approximately one hundred.
The Bureau will coordinate this supervision with other federal and
state bank regulators, who have supervisory authority over these enti-
ties, for safety and soundness, among other things.
Congress also transferred to the Bureau the authority to promul-
gate rules regarding federal consumer financial laws and to enforce
21 Id. § 5514.
22 Id. § 5514(a) (1).
23 Id. §§ 5561-5565. "Federal consumer financial law" is defined in § 5481(14).
24 Id. § 1812(a)(1)(B).
25 Id. § 3303(a) (4).
26 Id. § 5321 (b) (1)(D).
27 This includes most, but not all, consumer financial protection laws. See Id.
§ 5481(14).
28 Id. § 5515(a) (1).
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those laws and regulations against certain entities. 29 In particular, the
Bureau is now charged with implementing and enforcing the follow-
ing laws, among others:
" The Truth in Lending Act (TILA),30 which requires that lend-
ers provide clear disclosures to consumers about the costs of a
mortgage, credit card, payday loan, or other consumer credit.
For example, TILA requires that credit card issuers disclose
annual percentage rates (APRs) to allow consumers to com-
pare product choices. In addition, the CARD Act of 200931
amended TILA to prohibit certain credit card practices, im-
prove disclosures, and create other important consumer pro-
tections. Congress also gave the Bureau jurisdiction over
other laws that amended TI[A: the Consumer Leasing Act,3 2
which covers leases; the Home Ownership and Equity Protec-
tion Act,33 which covers high-cost mortgages; and the Fair
Credit Billing Act,3 4 which provides certain protections re-
garding billing errors, grace periods, and other matters.
* The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),35 which governs the
behavior of consumer reporting agencies and establishes re-
quirements for entities that use credit reports or furnish infor-
mation to credit bureaus. FCRA also entitles consumers to
obtain a free copy of their credit report once a year from each
of the three nationwide credit bureaus.
" The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),36 which
regulates settlement services provided in connection with resi-
dential real estate transactions and requires certain disclo-
sures in mortgage transactions.
" The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 37 which prohibits
discrimination in lending on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, marital status, or age, or because a person
receives public assistance or has exercised a right under cer-
tain consumer protection laws.
29 Id. §§ 5515, 5564, 5581.
30 Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1667e) (2006)).
31 Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 and
16 U.S.C.). For more information on the CARD Act, see infra note 80.
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (2006).
33 Id. § 1639 (2006).
34 Id. §§ 1666-1666j (2006).
35 Id. §§ 1681-81x (2006) (except with respect to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(e), 1681(w),
which discuss identity theft and the disposal of records, respectively).
36 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831b, 2601-2610, 2614 -2617 (2006).
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2006).
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* The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) ,3 which re-
quires most lenders to disclose certain data about their mort-
gage lending, in part so that the public can determine
whether lenders are serving the needs of their local communi-
ties. This data can also be used to identify potentially discrimi-
natory lending practices.
" The Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 39 which provides a
framework to protect consumers engaging in electronic
money transfers.
* The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),40 which pro-
tects consumers against harassment and other unfair or de-
ceptive practices by debt collectors.
* The Truth in Savings Act (TISA) ,41 which requires uniform
disclosures of various rates and fees for deposit accounts.
* The privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,42
which require financial institutions to provide consumers with
privacy notices, including notice of the right to direct the in-
stitution not to disclose the consumer's nonpublic personal
information to unaffiliated third parties in certain
circumstances.
* The SAFE Mortgage Licensing Act,43 which provides for regis-
tration and some licensing of mortgage loan originators-
meaning brokers and mortgage loan officers-and establishes
minimum standards for state registration and licensing of
specified originators.
* A provision of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 200944 that
authorizes prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices
related to mortgage lending.
In addition, the Bureau is empowered to enforce a number of
rules issued by the Federal Trade Commission, including rules regard-
ing telemarketing sales and cooling-off periods for sales made at
homes. 45
38 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2006).
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2006). The Bureau did not assume authority over sec-
tion 920 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693r. See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12)(C).
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 16 9 2-1 6 9 2p (2006).
41 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (2006).
42 15 U.S.C. §§ 6802-6809 (2006). The Bureau did not assume authority over § 6805
as it applies to § 6801(b). See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12)(U).
43 12 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5116 (2006).
44 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 626, 123 Stat. 524 (2009) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 12, 16, 20, 30, 33, 42, 43, 48 and 50 U.S.C.).
45 See 12 U.S.C. § 5581 (b) (5). The Bureau is authorized to enforce FTC rules includ-
ing, among other things: Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (2011); Use of Preno-
tification Negative Option Plans, 16 C.F.R. pt. 425 (2011); Rule Concerning Cooling-Off
Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain Other Locations, 16 C.F.R. pt. 429 (2011);
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C. The Challenge Ahead
The Bureau is focused on using the various tools that Congress
gave it to turn the Dodd-Frank Act's vision into reality. In the first
eighteen months since the Act's passage, the Bureau designed and
built an organization that expanded from a few employees to more
than 750 employees by the end of 201 1.46 The Bureau has attracted
highly qualified economists, lawyers, and experts from private indus-
try, government, academia, and nonprofit organizations, and has inte-
grated this talent into cross-disciplinary teams. The Bureau has
published empirical studies; issued regulations, including ones on re-
mittances and the Bureau's enforcement procedures; designed a na-
tionwide supervision program; consulted with many stakeholders;
and begun accepting credit card- and mortgage-related consumer
complaints. 47
Yet substantial challenges remain. Much of the damage that the
2008 financial crisis inflicted has not yet been repaired. Home prices
remain depressed in many areas. 48  Consumers struggle to access
needed credit.49 Some lenders remain burdened with troubled assets
and potentially significant liabilities.50 Problematic lending practices
persist, including credit agreements that are difficult to understand
and compare.
Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (2011); Credit Prac-
tices, 16 C.F.R. pt. 444 (2011); Mail or Telephone Order Merchandise, 16 C.F.R. pt. 435
(2011); Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 16 C.F.R. pt.
436 (2011); and Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Business Opportu-
nities, 16 C.F.R. pt. 437 (2011).
46 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., RE-
VIEW OF CFPB IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING ACTIrrIES 5 (2011) [hereinafter OFFICES OF IN-
SPECTOR GENERAL]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: JULY 21-DECEMBER 31, 2011, at 6 (2012) [hereinafter
CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT].
47 See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS REPORT
(2011) [hereinafter CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB] (reporting on the employees, projects,
and methods employed by the CFPB); CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46 (same).
For an evaluation of the Bureau's early activities, see OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra
note 46, at 2, 6-7 (reporting that the CFPB has (1) "identified and documented implemen-
tation activities critical to standing up the agency's functions and necessary to address cer-
tain Dodd-Frank Act requirements," (2) "developed and is implementing appropriate
plans that support ongoing operations as well as the transfer of employees and functions,"
and (3) "has completed elements of its implementation plans and is making progress on
others, including its overall strategic plan").
48 See Economic Outlook, supra note 6, at 3-4; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
Sys., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND PoLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1
(2012).
49 See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: GRAPPLING WITH
CRISIS LEGACIES 29 (2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2011/
02/pdf/text.pdf.
50 See KATALINA BIANCO, A RETROSPECTIVE OF THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
(2011), available at http://www.cch.com/press/news/WhitePaperTARP.pdf.
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Through the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress assigned multiple agen-
cies the responsibility of alleviating these problems and preventing
their recurrence. 51 The Bureau has a very important role to play
within this broader framework. The Bureau must not only achieve the
goals that Congress set for it but do so in a thoughtful and targeted
manner.
The United States has faced and successfully addressed similar
challenges in the past. To take just a few examples, in 1887, Congress
created the Interstate Commerce Commission, an independent
agency, to curb the railroads from abusing their market power-and
the agency had much success in doing so. 52 Another independent
agency, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), was created
in large part to correct market failures that prevented efficient utiliza-
tion of the radio frequency spectrum in the growing and increasingly
complex radio business. 53 Since the 1930s, the FCC has evolved to
respond to changes prompted by massive technological innovations in
television, satellites, computers, mobile phones, and other technolo-
gies. In the wake of the Great Depression and the related stock mar-
ket crash, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).54 The SEC was charged with ensuring adequate disclosures of
material information to buyers and sellers of securities. 55 The Com-
mission had to develop expertise and to evolve with changes in the
financial markets, and investors were safer as a result.5 6
Past financial crises have also led to the creation of successful,
independent banking agencies. In response to the bank panics dur-
ing the Depression, Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance
51 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 111-112 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5321-5322 (Supp. IV 2010)) (establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council, an
entity comprised of representatives from several federal agencies that "will respond to
emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system"); id. §§ 941-946
(generally requiring the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and
the Federal Housing Finance Agency jointly to prescribe regulations requiring credit risk
retention by securitizers in connection with asset-backed securities involving certain resi-
dential mortgage assets and exempting "qualified residential mortgages" as defined by
those agencies).
52 See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 4941, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. For a
survey of the empirical evidence of the Act's effects, see generally Thomas W. Gilligan et
al., Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 32J.L. &
ECON. 35 (1989).
53 See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
54 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a- 7 8pp).
55 See id. § 6.
56 For a description of the SEC's evolution, see ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND
CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 41 (1992).
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Corporation (FDIC), an independent agency tasked with maintaining
stability and public confidence in the nation's banking system. 57
Before the FDIC's creation, the banking system suffered numerous
panics and bank runs.58 Using its independence and expertise, the
FDIC has made substantial changes in the banking system since the
1930s that have increased the confidence of bank depositors. It gave
customers of FDIC-insured banks the assurance that their deposits
were insured, up to specified limits, by the full faith and credit of the
United States, largely preventing bank runs. No customer has ever
lost insured funds, and the widespread bank runs of the Great Depres-
sion have never recurred. 59 It is noteworthy that Congress chose to
put the bank insurance and resolution functions in a new institution
that would largely be devoted to this important task.
Congress acted in this same tradition in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis by creating the CFPB. The Bureau must be an expert,
durable, and flexible institution that will adapt over time to address
substantial challenges. Part II describes the principles that have
guided the Bureau to date as it strives to fulfill this mission.
II
THE CFPB's APPROACH: MARKET-BASED, EVIDENCE-BASED,
OPEN TO PUBLIC INPUT, AND GUIDED BY HISTORY
AND OTHER AGENCIES' EXPERIENCE
As the first twenty-first-century consumer protection agency, the
CFPB has employed innovative approaches to fulfilling the goals set by
Congress. Consistent with its statutory mandate to make markets in
financial products and services work better for consumers, the Bureau
has maintained its overriding belief in the power of competitive mar-
kets. To craft the most effective regulations, the Bureau will strive to
make extensive use of empirical evidence and public input. In partic-
ular, the Bureau has hired teams of expert researchers to study partic-
ular consumer financial markets and household finances generally
and has increased opportunities for diverse populations to provide
meaningful input by using new technologies and implementing ro-
bust transparency policies. Finally, the Bureau has drawn on, and will
continue to draw on, other agencies' experiences and best practices in
creating processes that will enable it to remain true to these values
and to fulfill its mission.
57 See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162.
58 For an overview of the instability in the banking system prior to creation of the
FDIC, see generally ELMus WICKER, BANKING PANICS OF THE GILDED AGE (2000).
59 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE FDIC 1933-
1983, at 4, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/firstfifty/chapterl.pdf.
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A. A Market-Based Approach
Four decades ago, Professor Alfred E. Kahn remarked that com-
petition was far better than regulation at bringing about "positively
good' economic performance. 60 While governmental regulation gen-
erally counteracts bad outcomes after the fact, competition can bring
about performance that is "efficient, progressive, risk-taking, [and] in-
novative." 61 Thus, Kahn argued, regulators should focus on fostering
institutions that would exert market-like influence on regulated enti-
ties. 62 These ideas caught the attention of conservatives and liberals
alike, prompting deregulation of major sectors of the economy in-
cluding railroads, trucking, and airlines. 63
Like Kahn, the Bureau believes in the power of competition and
markets to produce "positively good" outcomes. The experience of
the past several years has proven, however, that the credit market is
particularly susceptible to market failures, which can produce highly
destructive economic and financial results. 64 These failures restrict
the advantages that the market and competitive forces can offer. 65
Congress assigned the Bureau the important task of addressing
these market failures. In particular, Congress directed the Bureau to
exercise its authorities to ensure, among other things, that "markets
for consumer financial products and services operate transparently
and efficiently to facilitate access and innovation."6 6 Consistent with
this core purpose, the Bureau will work to ensure that the markets for
consumer financial products and services work properly and have the
opportunity to yield "positively good" economic performance.
First, to work properly, the markets in consumer financial prod-
ucts and services must be transparent. But some of these markets
have been far from transparent. Many consumers have unwittingly
taken on loans with hidden fees, unexpected interest-rate hikes, and
other unknown and unaffordable costs or obligations. A core goal of
the Bureau will be to improve consumers' ability to understand the




63 See Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895; Motor Carrier Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793; Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
504, 92 Stat. 1705; Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-210, 90 Stat. 31.
64 For a discussion of why markets in consumer financial products have failed, see
generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 9, at 10-25.
65 In his recent book, Judge Posner concludes that the actions of unregulated actors
led to the current crisis and that U.S. financial markets need to be more heavily regulated.
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DE-
SCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).
66 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b) (5) (Supp. IV 2010).
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costs and risks of products and to compare products before making
their choices. 67 Bureau initiatives to improve disclosure requirements
will play an important role in achieving this goal, as will consumer
education and financial literacy programs.
Second, and equally important, competition in the markets
should take place on a level playing field. In the past, different levels
of federal oversight have applied to different types of firms, even when
those firms offered nearly identical consumer financial services or
products. The Bureau will work to ensure more consistent oversight
across different types of financial service providers, including inde-
pendent nonbank companies that historically have not been subject to
federal supervision. 68 With the consistent application of consumer
protection rules, providers will be able to compete fairly on the basis
of price, quality, and service. In this way, the Bureau's activities can
benefit not only consumers but also the responsible firms that play by
the rules-and our economy as a whole.
Finally, incentives in the market for consumer financial services
must be better aligned with positive outcomes.69 With the exotic fi-
nancial securities that proliferated in the years before the financial
crisis, loan originators could more easily pass off high-risk loans and
thus had fewer effective incentives to make loans only to borrowers
capable of repaying them.70 The Dodd-Frank Act addresses these in-
centive problems in a number of provisions, including some that the
CFPB is not responsible for implementing, such as those requiring
sponsors of asset-backed securities generally to retain a percentage of
the credit risk.71 But the Act also gives the Bureau an important role
in realigning incentives in the market. For instance, it will issue regu-
lations to implement new statutory provisions imposing a duty on
lenders to determine whether consumers have a reasonable ability to
repay mortgages.7 2 Implementing these provisions is a key step in
67 See CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB, supra note 47, at 9-14.
68 See 12 U.S.C. § 5514.
69 For a more in-depth discussion of the Bureau's role in increasing transparency and
fairness and realigning incentives, see Raj Date, Special Advisor to the Sec'y of the Treasury
for the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at the American Bankers Regulatory Sympo-
sium (Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speech/remarks-by-
raj-date-at-american-bankers-regulatory-symposium/.
70 See id.
71 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (Supp. IV 2010).
72 Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System issued a proposed rule on ability-to-repay requirements in May 2011. Regulation Z;
Truth in Lending, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,390 (May 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226);
see also Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) ("[N]o creditor may make a residential
mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determina-
tion... [that] the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan .... ."). The author-
ity to finalize this proposed rule transferred to the Bureau on July 21, 2011. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 5581 (Supp. IV 2010).
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preventing recurrence of the market failures that led to the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis.
By promoting transparency, making competition fair, and
counteracting misaligned incentives, the Bureau will help to create
well-functioning markets that promise to produce "positively good"
market outcomes that benefit both consumers and financial service
providers.
B. A Focus on Evidence-Based Analysis
The Bureau's belief in markets is accompanied by a recognition
that it must understand a market well to be able to regulate it effec-
tively. This recognition drives an overarching focus on empirical data
throughout the Bureau's work. The CFPB's commitment to being a
fact-based, pragmatic, and deliberative agency will help it to under-
stand the complicated consumer financial markets for which it has
responsibility and, in turn, to promulgate better, smarter, and more
effective regulations.
The CFPB's very structure is designed to make research and mar-
ket analytics central to its work. The Bureau's Division of Research,
Markets, and Regulations, one of the Bureau's six major divisions,
houses not only the attorneys responsible for managing and executing
the Bureau's authority to prescribe rules but also a research team and
several markets teams. Each team is staffed with a combination of pro-
fessionals from different backgrounds and has the capacity to collect
and analyze data necessary to inform the Bureau's work.
Headed by leading economist Sendhil Mullainathan, 73 the econo-
mists, social scientists, and data analysts in the Bureau's Office of Re-
search are dedicated to independent, foundational, and applied
research on a variety of consumer financial topics, including individ-
ual and household decision making, firm behavior, optimal regula-
tion, and the effectiveness of disclosures. The Office will seek out the
best available data for use in research and policy evaluation from ex-
isting commercial and government sources and ultimately may de-
velop original datasets through surveys, consumer testing, and
collaboration with industry and consumer advocates. The researchers
in the Office will also have the opportunity to conduct self-directed
research and to publish in their own names where permitted by law,
without Bureau approval of the policy content. This will promote
73 See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Treasury Department Announces
Senior Leadership Hires for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (May 11, 2011),
available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressrelease/treasury-department-an-
nounces-senior-leadership-hires-for-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/. Sendhil
Mullainathan is a Professor of Economics at Harvard University and recipient of the Mac-
Arthur Foundation "genius award." Id.
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honest investigation, independent thinking, and open discussion that
will support evidence-based-rather than myopic or ideological-
policymaking.
While the Office develops and analyzes data on consumer finan-
cial markets and household finances, highly seasoned experts on the
markets teams monitor the U.S. consumer financial markets for
emerging risks and provide empirically based policy analysis in dis-
tinct consumer financial markets, including: credit cards and other
card-based products; residential mortgages; installment and liquidity
lending (e.g., student lending and payday loans); and deposits, debt
collection, and credit reporting.
Housing the Research, Markets, and Regulations teams together
in one division helps to ensure that the insights of expert researchers,
economists, and market practitioners are all reflected in the Bureau's
policymaking and rulemaking processes. The research and markets
teams are setting the empirical groundwork for developing the Bu-
reau's policy and regulatory priorities and potential rules, helping to
measure the effectiveness of existing regulations, and providing ongo-
ing analytical support and market intelligence for active rulemaking.
For example, on a day-to-day basis, staff from the research and mar-
kets teams, as well as from the Bureau's other divisions, actively par-
ticipate in meetings with regulatory attorneys to discuss market-related
issues and other analyses germane to implementing the federal con-
sumer financial laws. Their participation from inception to comple-
tion of the rulemaking process ensures that regulatory decisions are
made on the basis of sound market analysis and understanding and,
in turn, creates a path for more effective regulations.
Already, the Bureau has published several empirical studies that
highlight its commitment to evidence-based regulation. In July 2011,
for example, the Bureau released a report that describes the credit-
scoring industry, relevant market participants, and the complexity of
the credit-scoring process.7 4 This report examines how credit scores
are obtained and used as well as how differences between scores pro-
vided to creditors and scores provided to consumers could potentially
harm consumers. Building on this initial research, the CFPB is now
undertaking a substantial data collection and analysis project that will
explore the nature, range, and size of variations between the credit
scores used by creditors and those sold to consumers in order to shed
more light on whether, and the extent to which, these variations are
74 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONSUMER-
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harming consumers. This project will provide valuable insight for the
development of Bureau policy and potential activity in this area.
The Bureau also published a report on remittance transfers. 75
The report provides background on the remittance transfer market,
including information about consumer demand, providers, products,
and consumer behavior.7 6 Drawing in part on this understanding of
the remittance transfer market, the Bureau has issued regulations de-
signed to achieve transparency and effective disclosure of exchange
rates used for remittance transfers. 77 The report separately considers
whether and how remittance histories can be used to enhance con-
sumers' credit scores.78 Going forward, the CFPB will further explore
these questions by conducting empirical research into the potential
value of remittance transfer data in predicting a consumer's credit
repayment behavior.
In addition to collecting and analyzing data on markets and po-
tential problems facing consumers, the Bureau will also conduct retro-
spective empirical evaluations of existing regulations' impact. To
ensure that consumer financial protection laws and regulations pro-
tect consumers without unintended adverse consequences, 79 the
CFPB has begun to collect and analyze data on the effectiveness of
existing regulations. In particular, in February 2011, as part of a con-
ference on the first anniversary of the CARD Act,80 the CFPB surveyed
cardholders and the nine largest credit card issuers, representing ap-
proximately 90% of the market.8 1 The studies revealed that, consis-
tent with the purpose of the CARD Act, the long-standing practice of
75 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Report on Remittance Transfers: Report to the
President, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the House
of Representatives Committee on Financial Services (2011) [hereinafter CFPB, REPORT ON
REMITTANCE TRANSFERS], available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2011/07/Report_201 10720_RemittanceTransfers.pdf.
76 See id. at 3-11.
77 See Electronic Fund Transfers, 77 Fed. Reg. 6194 (Feb. 7, 2012) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 1005).
78 See CFPB, REPORT ON REMITTANCE TRANSFERS, supra note 75, at 25-43.
79 Critics of the Dodd-Frank Act have cautioned that the Act could restrict economic
growth and limit consumer credit by increasing its cost and decreasing its availability. See,
e.g., THE FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, CUMULATIVE WEIGHT: A COMPILATION OF REPORTS AND
PUBLIC STATEMENTS RELATED TO THE CUMULATIVE WEIGHT OF REGULATIONS MANDATED BY
THE DODD-FRANK ACT (2011), available at http://www.fsround.org/fsr/publications and_
research/files/cumulativeweightwhitepaper.pdf (summarizing the potential negative im-
pact of Dodd-Frank regulations voiced in various studies and reports).
80 The CARD Act aims to improve the readability of credit card statements and to
curb credit card companies' practices of raising interest rates on existing accounts, charg-
ing excessive or unfair fees, and processing charges that exceed a consumer's credit limit
and lead to overlimit fees. See CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 and 16 U.S.C.).
81 See CARD Act Factsheet, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Feb. 22, 2011), http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-card-act/feb2Ol1-factsheet/.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
increasing interest rates on existing cardholder accounts has been
dramatically curtailed; the amount of late fees consumers are paying
has substantially declined; and overlimit fees have virtually disap-
peared.8 2 Among cardholders surveyed, 60% felt that, since the
CARD Act, their monthly statements had become easier to read and
that terms were clearer; yet many still reported uncertainty about their
APR or interest paid.83 Significantly, the total amount consumers are
paying for their credit cards is no higher, on average, than it was
before the CARD Act took effect.8 4
These kinds of fact-based analyses and studies of the consumer
financial marketplace will help the CFPB to promulgate more cost-
effective and beneficial regulations.
C. Facilitating Robust Public Participation Through Innovative
Technologies and Transparency
Empirical analysis alone, however, cannot guarantee the most ef-
fective regulation. Getting input from diverse parties-including con-
sumers, advocates, and regulated entities-is also essential. The
Bureau has accordingly created systems to increase opportunities for
public participation in its work. In particular, the Bureau has em-
ployed innovative technologies to make it easy and convenient for
members of the public to report their problems and to share their
suggestions; the Bureau also has implemented strong transparency
policies that will increase public awareness and understanding of the
Bureau's activities.8 5 By facilitating robust public participation, the
Bureau will benefit from a broad spectrum of viewpoints and exper-
iences and avoid the risk of relying on biased and incomplete infor-
mation that may favor one segment of industry at the expense of
others and the public.8 6
The Bureau is taking full advantage of the opportunities that
building an agency from the ground up has given it for integrating
innovative technologies into its operations. Even before its launch,
the Bureau began reaching out to the public using Internet-based
tools. Months ahead of the transfer date, the Bureau unveiled its web-
site, ConsumerFinance.gov. Coinciding with the debut of the website
82 Id.
83 Synovate, Consumer Perceptions and Reactions to the CARD Act, 15-16 (2011),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/uploads/201 1/01/Synovate FINAL.pdf.
84 See David Silberman, The Credit CARD Act Turns One, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BuRE.AU
(Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-credit-card-act-turns-one/.
85 See CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB, supra note 47, at 17-18.
86 See Marnie Stetson, Reforming SLAPP Reform: New York's Anti-SLAPP Statute, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1324, 1359 (1995) (noting that "broadly protected participation rights [can] help
ensure a participatory democracy and provide an antidote to special interest capture of the
government").
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was the CFPB's "Open for Suggestions" campaign, which solicited
public input through multiple outlets, including Twitter, e-mail, and
YouTube videos. 8 7 The CFPB received hundreds of suggestions and
posted video responses to many on its YouTube channel. The Bureau
also launched a blog and social media outposts on Twitter, Facebook,
Flickr, and YouTube. These channels have been providing a steady
stream of information from the public about problems with consumer
financial products and suggestions for how to address those problems.
The Bureau is analyzing this information so that it can inform its pri-
orities and policymaking.
Of course, innovative uses of social media alone cannot guaran-
tee robust public participation in the Bureau's work. To contribute
meaningfully to the Bureau's work, the public must know what the
Bureau is planning and doing. Accordingly, the Bureau has imple-
mented strong transparency policies to maximize opportunities for
the kind of public input that will help make its rules more efficient
and effective.
From the start, Bureau staff met with open-government organiza-
tions, which provided valuable input regarding how to build trans-
parency into the makeup of the agency. For example, the Bureau
uses its website to provide consistent updates about its work and to
solicit public feedback. It has made available the raw data underlying
its study on the CARD Act's impact, enabling private parties to con-
duct their own analyses. Further, as discussed in more detail below,
the Bureau has adopted a policy governing ex parte communications
that balances the need to receive input on proposed rules from con-
sumers, industry, and other interested parties with a commitment to
transparency. 88
D. Learning from History and Borrowing Best Practices from
Other Agencies
While embracing twenty-first-century innovations, the Bureau has
also studied and learned from historical regulatory experiences and
the best practices of the private and public sectors, including those of
other federal agencies. To facilitate this learning process, the CFPB
has hired staff from many other federal agencies and from the private
sector.89 These staff members' diverse experiences have proven inval-
uable in structuring the agency and in consciously developing an insti-
tutional culture. The Bureau has also solicited input from leaders in
87 See CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB, supra note 47, at 17-18.
88 See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
89 In addition, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, employees from other agencies have
transferred to the Bureau. See 12 U.S.C. § 5584 (Supp. IV 2010).
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the private sector, government, community groups, academia, and
Congress in designing the Bureau's structure.
The Bureau has also learned from other agencies' specific poli-
cies and procedures. In drafting rules and policies governing ex parte
communications, disclosure of agency records and information, and
investigation and adjudication of violations of consumer financial
laws, the Bureau has used other agencies' rules that have proven effec-
tive as models and has adapted those rules to its own mission. Several
of these efforts are described in greater detail below.90 Similarly, in
establishing its pay scale and retirement system, and in organizing its
procurement system, the Bureau has modeled its own practices on the
best practices of other agencies.
Going forward, the Bureau will continue to learn from others'
experiences in its effort to build an effective consumer agency. For
example, the Bureau maintains open lines of communication with
state attorneys general and banking regulators, who can both provide
valuable insight into the landscape in their states and how enforce-
ment could be strengthened.9 1 The Bureau has been meeting-and
will continue to meet-with representatives from consumer groups
and financial institutions to hear their perspectives on the best ap-
proaches to supervision, regulation, and other areas of the Bureau's
responsibilities. In addition, the Bureau is learning from others in
developing financial education materials. It is talking to the Financial
Literacy and Education Commission-chaired by the Secretary of
Treasury, state and local financial education officials, and other lead-
ers in the field of financial education-to learn what others are doing,
what works, and what does not work. Drawing on this knowledge, the
Bureau will seek to develop new, more effective financial education
materials and, as appropriate, to adapt already-available materials to
suit its mission.
III
THE CFPB's APPROACH IN PRAc-riCE
A. The "Know Before You Owe" Mortgage Disclosure Project:
Relying on Data Analysis and Public Input to Craft a
Market-Based Solution to Consumer Confusion in
the Mortgage Market
Even before the transfer of rulemaking authority from other
agencies that occurred on July 21, 2011, the Bureau started working
on its "Know Before You Owe" (KBYO) mortgage initiative, a project
intended to fulfill Congress's directive that the Bureau integrate fed-
90 See infra notes 133-67 and accompanying text.
91 See CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB, supra note 47, at 29-30.
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eral disclosures for mortgage loan transactions. 92 This project aims to
create improved residential93 mortgage disclosure forms that will min-
imize consumer confusion and enable comparison shopping to pro-
duce better functioning mortgage markets. To fulfill this important
responsibility, the Bureau has taken an innovative approach that com-
bines rigorous empirical testing with robust public participation. This
preparatory work will lead to a proposed rule, expected in mid-2012,
which will go through the notice-and-comment process.
The stakes of this project are significant. Mortgage lending is a
huge industry affecting tens of millions of Americans. In October
2011, over fifty million U.S. residential mortgages, 94 representing 46%
of households, 95 were outstanding. These outstanding mortgages to-
taled roughly $10.4 trillion 96 and constituted a majority of consumer
credit in the United States.97 In 2010 alone, $1.57 trillion in U.S.
mortgage loans were originated.9 8 Yet shopping for and obtaining a
mortgage loan remains a complex process that can bewilder many
consumers.
99
Given the prevalence of mortgage loans and the widespread lack
of understanding of them before the financial crisis, Congress re-
92 See 12 U.S.C. § 5532(f); Know Before You Owe, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
93 Throughout this Article, "residential" is defined as one- to four-family dwellings, as
reflected in 12 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2011).
94 See EXPERIAN & OLIVER WYMAN, MARKET INTELLIGENCE REPORT: MORTGAGE REPORT
19 fig.24 (2011) (providing a value of $50.1 million) (on file with author); Mortgage Moni-
tor: November 2011 Mortgage Performance Observations, at 3, LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES
(Nov. 2011), http://www.lpsvcs.com/LPSCorporatelnformation/CommunicationCenter/
PressResources/Pages/MortgageMonitorArchive.aspx (follow "Complete Presentation"
hyperlink under "Data as of October 2011") (source can only be obtained online by author-
ized users) (providing a value of $51.6 million).
95 See State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/00000.html (last updated Jan. 17, 2012).
96 Mortgage Debt Outstanding, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/mortoutstand20 10930.htm
(last updated Sept. 30, 2011).
97 Consumer Credit, BOARD OF GOVEWRNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Dec. 7, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20111207/gl9.pdf.
98 INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE, ToP' 50 MORTGAGE ORIGINATORS IN 2010 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/issues/reports/top-mortgage/-1 000012
416-1.html (available online only for subscribing users).
99 See generally Brian K. Bucks & Karen M. Pence, Do Borrowers Know Their Mortgage
Terms, 64J. U"AN ECON. 218, 218, 221-28 (2008) (noting adjustable-rate mortgages have
become more complex in recent years); Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World
of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARv. J. LEGIS. 123, 125-27 (2007) (describing the evolution in the
mortgage market from average-cost-based to risk-based pricing); Mary Umberger, Survey




quired the Bureau to prioritize addressing this problem. 100 This man-
date follows decades of efforts by Congress and other regulators to
promote consumer understanding of mortgage products. In 1968,
Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to "assure a mean-
ingful disclosure of credit terms [including mortgage terms] so that
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit."''
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) promulgated Regulation Z to im-
plement TILA, and both the statute and the rule have been amended
many times. 10 2 After TILA's enactment, Congress passed the Real Es-
tate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) in 1974 to enable "more ef-
fective advance disclosure to home buyers and sellers of settlement
costs" and to prohibit kickbacks, unearned settlement fees, and vari-
ous other practices.' 0 3 Pursuant to RESPA, the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) promulgated rules requiring
mortgage brokers and lenders to provide two key disclosures in mort-
gage loan transactions: a good faith estimate (GFE) disclosure and a
final disbursement disclosure (HUD-1) at the closing of the loan.'0 4
Together, the TILA and RESPA disclosures that most consumers
currently receive within three days of applying for a mortgage loan
usually total five comprehensive, yet complex and often confusing,
pages. The copious amount of information presented on those forms
does not, on the whole, appear to be well designed for average con-
sumers to use.'0 5 Disclosures do not focus on the information con-
sumers may need most, such as total cash needed at closing or the size
of the payment shock at each rate reset. Further, some items-such as
prepayment penalty disclosures-may simply be too opaque for con-
sumers to understand and compare. Consumers that the Bureau in-
terviewed during its research lamented that they simply "don't know
100 See 12 U.S.C. § 5532(f) (Supp. IV 2010). The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Bureau
to propose for public comment new model mortgage disclosures and accompanying rules
within one year of the Bureau's launch on July 21, 2011. Id.
101 Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 102, 82 Stat. 146, 146
(1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
102 THOMAS A. DURKIN & GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, TRUTH IN LENDING: THEORY, HISTORY,
AND A WAY FORWARD 9 (2011) (stating that "Congress amended TILA in 1970, 1974, 1975,
1976 (twice), 1978, 1980 (major revision), 1981 (twice), 1982, 1984, 1987, 1988 (twice),
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 (twice), 1996, 1997, 1998, 2005, 2008, and 2009" and that the FRB
amended Regulation Z "more than fifty times").
103 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2006).
104 See 24 C.F.R. § 3500 (2011).
105 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRI-
CAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS ES-5-10, available at http:/
/www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/PO25505MortgageDisclosureexecutivesummary.pdf (finding
that current mortgage cost disclosures failed to convey key mortgage costs to many con-
sumers and that borrowers failed to understand key loan terms when viewing the
disclosures).
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what to do with" these forms. While many experts debated the extent
to which disclosure can actually promote informed decision making
by consumers,10 6 few believed at the end of 2010 that the disclosures
consumers were receiving were optimal.10 7 Even fewer believe that
the research necessary to create optimal forms already exists)10 8
Recognizing that the current system did not work, Congress in-
cluded TILA and RESPA among the statutes for which rulemaking
responsibility would transfer to the Bureau and charged the CFPB
with combining and improving the TILA and RESPA disclosures that
consumers currently receive.10 9 To carry out this mandate, the Bu-
reau created the "Know Before You Owe" mortgage initiative, which
aims to improve mortgage disclosures to enable consumers to under-
stand the relevant terms of credit being offered and to compare those
terms across providers and products. This market-based solution-
creating more effective disclosures-seeks to minimize consumer con-
fusion and promote a more effective, transparent, and level consumer
financial marketplace.
1. Establishing Project Objectives
The CFPB has decided to take a fresh approach to achieve this
goal. The Bureau is relying on both empirical testing and extensive
public participation throughout the process of developing a new dis-
closure form. In December 2010, the Treasury Department spon-
sored a research symposium that brought together academics,
lenders, and consumer advocates to discuss how to simplify federal
mortgage disclosures. Consumer groups explained that many con-
sumers failed to use current disclosures to assess costs or to compare
alternatives because the forms are "complicated and hard to tise." Ad-
ditionally, "[t] he forms came under even more intense criticism from
those who have to fill them out. Mortgage originators, particularly
community banks and credit unions that work closely with their cus-
tomers, described paperwork that was costly to complete and pro-
106 See, e.g., DURKIN & ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 102, at 53-82 (discussing behavioral
research questioning consumers' ability to make rational financial choices).
107 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REv. 647, 705-10 (2011); McCoy, supra note 99, at 154; Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmak-
ing and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707,
741-51 (2006).
108 See JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE Dis-
CLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS; FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT 2007, available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/PO25505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf.
109 See 12 U.S.C. § 5532(b) (Supp. IV 2010) (granting the Bureau the authority to de-
velop model disclosures and requiring consumer testing validation).
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duced little value for borrowers."110 In short, the forms were not
serving anyone well.
Shortly after the December 2010 research symposium, a cross-
functional team within the Bureau considered what appeared to be
the two fundamental questions implicated in executing Congress's
mandate: (1) What were the objectives of the disclosures? (i.e., what
'job" were the disclosures meant to do?11"); and (2) How could a new
form achieve those objectives?
On the first question, the team identified three core objectives.
The first objective was to identify what information consumers really
needed for comprehension and comparison and to present this infor-
mation on the combined forms in a manner consumers could under-
stand and use if they wanted to comparison shop. In other words, the
objective was to build a disclosure that would ensure that material
terms could be easily located and that would enable consumers to
compare loans offered by one lender or shop between lenders and
make better decisions given the options in the marketplace and their
individual goals and preferences. 112 The second objective was to en-
sure that the forms stand out from other loan documents so that con-
sumers could quickly determine what information was most critical to
their decision. The third objective was to ensure that any required
disclosures actually support better decision making by consumers.
In addressing the second question of how the new disclosure
form would achieve these objectives, the Bureau is relying on public
participation and empirical testing. Throughout the process, the
CFPB has consistently recognized that outcomes can be improved via
discussions with others. In particular, the Bureau recognizes the need
to consider implementation and operational issues, as well as other
matters, early in the process so it can make adjustments and test those
adjustments thoroughly. As a result, to facilitate the development of a
notice of proposed rulemaking, the CFPB released multiple drafts of
the disclosure forms for broad public input much earlier than other
regulators typically do. This has created additional complexity in the
short run, but has already yielded substantial benefits, such as im-
110 CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB, supra note 47, at 10.
1II For a description ofjob-based strategic analysis, see Clayton M. Christensen et al.,
Finding the Right Job for Your Product, 48 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring 2007, at 37-47.
112 Notably, the team identified the goal as enabling comparison. They believed that
the disclosure should facilitate shopping, but not force shopping to occur. Any new form
would therefore be evaluated based on how well it enables shopping, not on how much
shopping actually occurs. Enabling shopping can have a profound effect on the market.
Economic theory suggests that a more competitive market does not require every con-
sumer to shop and that the efforts ofjust a few (or even the potential efforts ofjust a few)
may benefit the entire marketplace. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
630, 638 (1979).
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provements to language that had confused consumers and more effec-
tive graphic designs. As the CFPB moves to next phases of its KBYO
project, it looks forward to even more feedback from the public
through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
2. Iterative, Collaborative Cycles
In May 2011, the CFPB publicly launched the "Know Before You
Owe" project.113 The goal was simple: to carry out the statutory man-
date to combine two federally required mortgage disclosures into a
single, simpler form that makes the costs and risks of the loan clear
and allows consumers to comparison shop for the best offer.114 The
Bureau sought feedback from other regulators, industry groups, con-
sumer groups, and individual consumers. Unlike most other agen-
cies, the Bureau sought this early feedback from the public through
iterative cycles and continuous collaboration as the Bureau conducted
its own consumer testing.1 1 5 The process adopted was, in its early
phases, more similar to best practice new product design11 6 than tradi-
tional rulemaking endeavors. This input provided a valuable supple-
ment to the Bureau's required public consultation.
Each iterative cycle consisted of the release of a new pair of de-
signs. In each cycle, the Bureau conducted a new phase of qualitative
testing, consisting of in-depth, one-on-one interviews with borrowers,
lenders, and brokers using well-established methodologies. 17 Impor-
tantly, the CFPB structured these interviews to test how well consum-
ers and lenders were able to use the forms, not individuals'
preferences between and among the forms.
At the same time that the Bureau was testing each set of forms, it
also posted them online with an interactive tool to gather public input
about the designs. By recording where users clicked as they reviewed
the draft disclosures, this tool allowed the Bureau to compile
"heatmaps" showing the areas of the disclosures that attracted the
most and least attention. 1 8 In addition, as a useful supplement to the
traditional public notice-and-comment process, the CFPB's interactive
tool permitted targeted input on the portions of the design that were
under investigation in that cycle. That targeted input allowed Bureau
113 See Aneesh Chopra, "Know Before You Owe, "THE WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH.
POL'Y (May 21, 2011, 5:59 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/21/know-you-
owe.
114 See CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB, supra note 47, at 10-11.
115 See id. at 11.
116 See, e.g., Stefan H. Thomke, Managing Experimentation in the Design of New Products,
44 MGMT. Sci. 743, 744-45 (1998).
117 See CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB, supra note 47, at 11.
118 Mortgage Disclosure Is Heating Up, CFPB BLOG (June 24, 2011), http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/mortgage-disclosure-is-heating-up/.
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staff to process the feedback quickly, iterate the forms, and then test
again in four weeks.
The process fostered robust public participation. The Bureau re-
ceived over 220,000 unique pageviews for KBYO, resulting in 27,000
comments (roughly half from consumers and half from industry) over
the first seven iterative cycles. 119 Those comments-combined with
the results of the qualitative testing-produced an approach to disclo-
sure that initial testing shows is serving the objectives of minimizing
consumer confusion and enabling comparison shopping. Seeking
broad-based public input as it conducted consumer testing, rather
than having a single public comment period on a full formal proposal,
has been central to the development and potential success of the Bu-
reau's proposed form. So far, the draft forms have enjoyed a high
level of approval among consumers, lenders, brokers, consumer advo-
cates, and other regulators, as evidenced by the discussions at roundt-
ables held in September 2011. These early results are promising as
the effort appears to have helped create an approach to disclosure
that better enables consumers to determine whether they can afford a
mortgage and whether they can get a better deal somewhere else.
Drawing on this experience, the Bureau expanded its "Know
Before You Owe" initiative to include student loans and credit cards.
In these initiatives, the Bureau developed prototype forms that aim to
make the costs and risks of those financial products easier to under-
stand.120 These prototypes are not formal proposals related to con-
sumer disclosure requirements, but are designed simply to promote a
conversation about what types of disclosures and information might
create better-functioning markets and better-informed consumers.
These initiatives promise meaningful benefits. Clarifying student loan
offers can help students understand their potential obligations, shop
for a better deal, and minimize educational debt service obligations.
Similarly, improving credit card agreements can help consumers un-
derstand the debts they may take on and empower consumers to make
the best decisions for themselves and to avoid costly surprises.
For each initiative, the Bureau drew on available data to develop
the prototype forms and invited input from the public, including con-
sumers, advocates, and the financial services industry. 121 For the
credit cards initiative, the Bureau also partnered with Pentagon Fed-
eral Credit Union, an institution with more than 350,000 credit card-
holders, to use its agreement in a pilot test.122 The Bureau continues
119 CFPB, SEMI-ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 13-14.
120 Id. at 13.
121 Id. at 13.
122 Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Aims to Simplify Credit Card Agreements (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://
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to work with Pentagon Federal and other card issuers who are inter-
ested in adopting simplified credit card agreements. By drawing on
feedback from consumers and industry alike, the Bureau will develop
consumer information documents that can help make markets work
better.
B. Office of Servicemember Affairs: Collecting Information to
Ensure Effective Education and Outreach
The Bureau has also sought broad public input to build market-
based programs to help servicemembers address their financial
problems. Finances are of great concern to military personnel and
their families, who are too often targeted by unscrupulous lenders. 123
Former Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Clif-
ford Stanley reported that finances are the second-largest cause of in-
creasing stress among servicemembers and their families, behind only
work and career concerns, and ahead of deployments, health, life
events, and war.124 Financial concerns not only hurt individual ser-
vicemembers but also can compromise national security. 125 A 2006
Department of Defense report concluded that predatory lending di-
rected at servicemembers "undermines military readiness, harms the
morale of troops and their families, and adds to the cost of fielding an
all volunteer fighting force."1 26
To help reduce or eliminate these problems, Congress required
the Bureau to establish an Office of Servicemember Affairs that could
address the financial issues faced by members of the military.127
Among other things, this Office is charged with educating and em-
www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-aims-to-
simplify-credit-card-agreements/.
123 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 4 (2006), available at http://
www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report-to_congress-final.pdf ("Predatory lending practices
are prevalent and target military personnel, either through proximity and prevalence
around military installations, or through the use of affinity marketing techniques, particu-
larly on-line."). See generally Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending
and the Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
653, 709-832 (2005) (providing in-depth empirical evidence and analysis showing that pay-
day lenders target military personnel and their families).
124 Military Saves Week 2011, U.S. MARINES (Jan. 24, 2011), available at http://
www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/MARADMIN057-11.aspx (last visited Mar. 19,
2012).
125 See id. (quoting Undersecretary Stanley as saying that "the Department of Defense
fully believes that personal financial readiness of our troops and families equates to mis-
sion readiness").
126 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 123, at 9.
127 Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5493(e) (Supp. IV 2010).
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powering servicemembers and their families to make better-informed
decisions when choosing financial services and products. 128
The CFPB's approach to fulfilling this mission has exemplified its
commitment to evidence-based programs and its belief in the power
of the market. In particular, the Bureau has collected information
from diverse sources to shape outreach and education campaigns that
will promote servicemembers' ability to understand and analyze the
costs and benefits of different financial products and services. 129
Under the leadership of Holly Petraeus, 130 the Office has been collect-
ing information from servicemembers, their advocates and counsel-
ors, and industry participants about the financial challenges that
servicemembers face and the consumer financial products and ser-
vices marketed to them. The Office has hosted town hall meetings
with military families and roundtable discussions with financial readi-
ness program managers and counselors, legal assistance lawyers, chap-
lains, and other professionals serving the military community? 3
These meetings have educated the Bureau about what financial issues
are most significantly affecting servicemembers and about local advo-
cates' best practices for protecting against harmful lending practices.
The meetings have also given the Bureau a better understanding of
how servicemembers' special circumstances-such as deployments,
permanent change-of-station moves, overseas assignments, and reloca-
tions-can present unique financial challenges to military families
and their creditors. The Bureau is now using the insights gained in
these meetings to shape financial education programs for
servicemembers.
The Bureau also launched an initiative to collect data on the ben-
eficial financial products that companies offer servicemembers and
128 Id. § 5493(e) (1) (A). The Office of Servicemember Affairs will also monitor com-
plaints by servicemembers and their families, as well as the responses to those complaints,
and coordinate efforts among federal and state agencies regarding consumer financial pro-
tection measures for servicemembers and their families. Id. § 5493(e) (1) (B)-(C).
129 See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Analyzing Financial Products Tailored to Servicemembers (Sept. 7, 2011), available
at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressrelease/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-
analyzing-financial-products-tailored-to-servicemembers/.
130 As the wife of General David Petraeus, the mother, sister, daughter, grand-
daughter, and great-granddaughter of servicemembers, and the former Director of the
Better Business Bureau Military Line, Holly Petraeus has a deep understanding of the
kinds of financial obstacles that men and women in the armed forces encounter. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Department Announces Holly Petraeus to
Establish Office of Servicemember Affairs for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Jan.
6, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tglO15.aspx. This
depth of personal and professional experience will greatly promote the programmatic
ends of learning from and responding to the needs of the military community.
131 See Elizabeth Warren & Holly Petraeus, Hearing Directly from Our Servicemembers, CON-
SUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/oped/hear
ing-direcdy-from-our-servicemembers/.
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their families. In September, the Bureau published a notice in the
Federal Register seeking information on financial products and ser-
vices offered to servicemembers and their families. 132 The Bureau re-
ceived dozens of responses, primarily from financial service providers
about products and services tailored to servicemembers' financial
needs, accommodations and benefits provided to servicemembers that
exceed those required or available under federal law, 133 and special
assistance offered to distressed homeowners affiliated with the mili-
tary. The responses show that many companies have offered products
and programs tailored to servicemembers, such as short-term, small-
dollar loans with interest rates lower than those offered by payday
lenders and matching savings programs. 13 4
Building on these responses, the Bureau hosted a Financial Fit-
ness Forum that featured panels consisting of servicemembers, repre-
sentatives from banking and credit union trade associations, and
individual financial institutions.' 35 These panelists shared innovative
ideas for meeting military customers' unique needs in a way that al-
lows financial institutions to thrive as well.
The Bureau will evaluate the information about these products
and programs and, as appropriate, will incorporate it into ser-
vicemember education and outreach programs. Better information
about what banks, credit unions, and other companies are offering
military personnel will ease servicemembers' burdens in choosing the
products and services that best meet their needs. The Bureau will also
continue to educate financial service providers about other providers'
practices as a way to encourage healthy competition. By encouraging
service providers to improve their offerings and educating ser-
vicemembers about how to select the products best suited to their par-
132 Request for Information on Consumer Financial Products and Services Offered to
Servicemembers, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,998 (Sept. 6, 2011). The notice also requested informa-
tion about the financial education opportunities that companies offered servicemembers
and about the nature and effectiveness of marketing and communication strategies
targeted at servicemembers and their families. Id.
133 For example, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act prevents creditors from charging
more than 6% interest on a servicemember's preservice debt during a servicemember's
period of military service. 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(a). Some banks reported that they have
lowered servicemembers' interest rates to below the statutory maximum. See, e.g., Com-
ment on Notice, Request for Information: Consumer Financial Products and Services Of-
fered to Servicemembers, Docket No. CFPB-2011-0016-0080, REGULATIONS.GOV (Sept.20,
2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2011-0016-
0080.
134 See Kate Davidson, CFPB Plans Financial Boot Camp for Military, AM. BANKER (Dec. 16,
2011, 4:41 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_243/CFPB-military-service
member-defense-Petraeus-foreclosure-1044975-1.html (available online only for subscrib-
ing users).
135 Holly Petraeus, Financial Fitness Forum, CFPB BLOG (Dec. 16, 2011), http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/financial-fitness-forum/.
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ticular needs, the Bureau aims to make the markets work better for
servicemembers.
C. Ex Parte Policy: Promoting Transparency and Evidence-Based
Decision Making
While rigorous data analysis and collection of input from diverse
sources informs the Bureau's initial policymaking and program build-
ing, feedback and information provided by interested parties during
the notice-and-comment period is also crucial to the Bureau's evi-
dence-based approach to policymaking. Ideas and comments re-
ceived in response to a proposed rule are critical in shaping the
Bureau's ultimate regulations. The primary and preferred means for
the Bureau to collect public input regarding proposed rules is
through written comments that are posted on the rulemaking docket.
But, in some cases, pertinent information may also come through tele-
phone calls, e-mails, face-to-face meetings, and written letters. The
Bureau has carefully considered how to handle such informal "ex
partd' communications during the notice-and-comment process. The
policy that the Bureau adopted seeks to accommodate both a commit-
ment to transparency and an openness to information and feedback
from various sources to support its evidence-based policymaking. 136
As a supplement to written comments, ex parte communication
can be a valuable means for the Bureau to consult with the public and
can provide a valuable diversity of perspectives and additional infor-
mation. Not all parties interested in a rule have the resources or so-
phistication to file extensive comment letters that effectively convey
their viewpoints. Some parties can better explain their perspective in
a phone call or meeting. Barring all ex parte communication could
diminish these groups' ability to be heard. 137 In some cases, ex parte
communication can also be an important means for the Bureau to
receive information on rulemaking proposals and to obtain clarifica-
tion on and elaboration of comments filed in rulemaking proceed-
ings. In all instances, ex parte communications are intended to
supplement and not replace written comments to the rulemaking
docket. By allowing these communications, the Bureau facilitates in-
put by many interested parties and ensures that it will have access to
136 See CFPB Policy on Ex Parte Presentations in Rulemaking Proceedings, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU BULL. 11-3, (Aug. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Ex Parte Presentations], available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Bulletin_20110819_Ex
PartePresentationsRulemakingProceedings.pdf.
137 See generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HRv. L. Rev. 1511, 1530 (1992) (noting that the citizenry requires "[b]road rights of
access" to administrative agencies and that "[r]epresentatives of all interests potentially
affected by a government action must have meaningful opportunities to engage in discus-
sion about the action").
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the best available information. This information supplements the em-
pirical data analysis that drives much of the Bureau's work.
At the same time, the Bureau's ex parte policy promotes trans-
parency, fairness, .and deliberation among parties interested in the
rule by requiring disclosure of ex parte communications. Under the
policy, ex parte presentations must be summarized and disclosed on
the public docket. 138 The policy applies to communications that are
directed to the merits or outcome of an open rulemaking proceed-
ing-from the publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking or in-
terim final rule until final disposition of the rulemaking.' 3 9 Through
this disclosure, any interested party can see the information that the
Bureau has received. This preserves the. transparency of the rulemak-
ing process, increases public deliberation, and gives the Bureau access
to better quality information and data.
D. Adjudication Rules: Learning from Other Federal Regulators
The Bureau is drawing on the experiences of other regulators in
shaping many of its procedures. This Section highlights some of the
ways in which the Bureau has gained insight and guidance from the
practices of other federal agencies in drafting the rules that will gov-
ern its administrative adjudications. Congress vested the Bureau with
broad authority to enforce federal consumer financial protection laws
in the courts or through administrative adjudications. 140 The Dodd-
Frank Act, however, does not detail the administrative adjudication
process that the Bureau should utilize but rather requires the Bureau
to promulgate rules establishing adjudication procedures.141 In doing
so, the Bureau has sought the advice of other regulators and has at-
tempted to learn from their experiences and to adopt their best prac-
tices. The Bureau's goal was to establish an administrative process
that is both fair and efficient.
Shortly after its launch date in July 2011, the Bureau issued in-
terim final rules governing its adjudication proceedings (Adjudication
Rules). 142 The Bureau's Adjudication Rules govern proceedings
138 Ex Parte Presentations, supra note 136, § (d) (1)-(2). The policy explains certain cir-
cumstances that do not require disclosure and where the Bureau retains discretion to
make modifications as appropriate during particular rulemakings. Id. § (e).
139 Id. § (b)(1)(A).
140 See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5562-5564 (Supp. IV 2010).
141 12 U.S.C. § 5563(e).
142 Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,338 (July 28, 2011)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1081). This discussion refers to the Bureau's interim final rule.
After this Article was finalized, but before it was published, the Bureau issued a final rule in
response to the comments it received regarding the interim final rule. The reader is en-
couraged to review the Bureau's final rule for further information regarding the Bureau's
efforts to craft a fair and efficient administrative process.
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brought under section 1053 of the Dodd-Frank Act,1 43 which autho-
rizes the Bureau to use administrative adjudications to ensure or en-
force compliance with the Act, the Bureau's rules, or any other
federal law or regulation that the Bureau is authorized to enforce. 144
In drafting the Adjudication Rules, the Bureau carefully considered
the rules and procedures of federal banking regulators, the FTC, and
the SEC. 145 The Bureau also referred to the Model Adjudication
Rules prepared by the Administrative Conference of the United
States.146
In developing the Adjudication Rules, the Bureau aimed to cre-
ate a process that would both provide for expeditious resolution of
claims and guarantee respondents a fair hearing. To achieve these
goals, the Bureau looked to the history of administrative proceedings
at the FTC and SEC and learned from those agencies' experience. 147
More specifically, in the last twenty years, both the SEC and the FTC
have revised their rules to make the adjudicatory process more effi-
cient. In 1990, the SEC created a task force to review its rules and
procedures governing administrative proceedings "to identify sources
of delay in those proceedings and to recommend steps to make the
adjudicatory process more efficient and effective." 148 Drawing on this
task force's recommendations, the SEC revised its rules in 1995.149
The FTC similarly revised its rules in 2008 to improve its adjudicatory
process, which had "long been criticized as being too protracted."1 50
The FTC's revised rules sought to "strike an appropriate balance be-
tween the need for fair process and quality decisionmaking, the desire
for efficient and speedy resolution of matters, and the potential costs
imposed on the Commission and the parties."1 51 Studying this history
allowed the Bureau to gain a better understanding of the advantages
and disadvantages of different procedures.
In drafting its Adjudication Rules, the Bureau adopted these
agencies' best practices and sought to improve upon their efforts to
streamline proceedings without compromising fairness to the parties.
For example, for purposes of its interim final rule, the Bureau de-
cided to adopt the SEC's affirmative disclosure approach to fact dis-
143 12 U.S.C. § 5563.
144 Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. at 45,338.
145 See id.
146 Id. (citing Michael P. Cox, The Model Adjudication Rules (MARs), 11 T.M. COOLEY L.
REv. 75 (1994)).
147 Id.
148 Rules of Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738, 32,738 (June 23, 1995).
149 Id.
150 Rules of Practice, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,832, 58,832-33 (Oct. 7, 2008).
151 Id. at 58,833.
1172 [Vol. 97:1141
2012] THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 1173
covery in administrative adjudications. 15 2  In particular, the
Adjudication Rules generally require the Enforcement Office to make
available for inspection and copying by any party documents that the
Office obtained from persons not employed by the Bureau during the
investigative phase.153 The SEC codified a similar practice in 1995 in
part to help make proceedings more fair and efficient.154 By adopting
the SEC's basic approach in this regard, the Bureau aims to ensure
fairness to respondents while streamlining resolution of administra-
tive proceedings. 155 By requiring the affirmative disclosure of infor-
mation, the Bureau seeks to ensure that respondents have a full
understanding of the factual basis of the charges at an early stage of
the proceedings so that they can efficiently determine what defenses
to present and whether to seek settlement. 156 At the same time, be-
cause this approach reduces the need for traditional fact discovery, it
will allow for faster and more efficient resolution of the Bureau's ad-
ministrative claims, conserving both the Bureau's and respondents'
resources. 15 7 The Bureau's rule also includes exceptions to the af-
firmative disclosure requirement, largely based on the exceptions con-
tained in the SEC's analogous rule. 158 These exceptions balance "the
needs of respondents, the rights of those who have submitted docu-
ments, and the [agency's] legitimate interests in maintaining effective
law enforcement. 159
The Bureau's Adjudication Rules also adopt certain timelines
modeled on the SEC and FTC rules to encourage expeditious resolu-
tion of proceedings. Like the SEC's rules, the Bureau's rules require a
hearing officer to issue a recommended decision within 300 days of
service of the notice of charges. 160 The Adjudication Rules permit
hearing officers to request an extension of this 300-day deadline in
individual cases but state that the Director will only rarely grant such
extensions. 61 The Adjudication Rules also follow the SEC's standards
governing extensions of time, which are generally disfavored. 16 2 To
152 Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,338, 45,344 (July
28, 2011).
153 12 C.F.R. § 1081.206(a)-(b) (2011).
154 See Rules of Practice, 58 Fed. Reg. 61,732, 61,750 (Nov. 22, 1993).
155 See Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. at 45,339.
156 Id. at 45,344.
157 Id.
158 Id.; Rules of Practice, 58 Fed. Reg. at 61,750.
159 Rules of Practice, 58 Fed. Reg. at 61,750.
160 12 C.F.R. § 1081.400 (2011) (CFPB rule); 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a) (2) (2011) (SEC
rule).
161 Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,350; 12 C.F.R.
§ 1081.400.
162 Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,342; 12 C.F.R.
§§ 1081.115, 1081.400. This applies to requests for extensions by the hearing officer and
by the parties. If the hearing officer seeks an extension of the 300-day deadline, both the
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further facilitate speedy resolution of matters, the Bureau's Adjudica-
tion Rules prescribe a rule similar to one of the FTC that requires
hearing officers to file their recommended decisions within ninety
days after the deadline for filing post-hearing responsive briefs. 163
In addition, the Bureau followed the SEC's lead in requiring the
hearing officer to convene a pretrial conference soon after initiation
of proceedings to set a schedule appropriate to the particular pro-
ceeding.1 64 The rules further require the parties to meet before the
conference to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and de-
fenses, the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the
case, and other matters that can or should be addressed at the sched-
uling conference. 165 In 1995, the SEC amended its rules to make such
pretrial conferences mandatory in most instances. 166 The SEC made
this change "because such a conference can eliminate unnecessary de-
lay and improve the quality of adjudicative decisionmaking by sharp-
ening the preparation of cases and presentation of issues."'167 By
similarly requiring such pretrial conferences to take place shortly after
initiation of proceedings, the Bureau expects its rules to offer these
same benefits.
In sum, relying on the past experiences of other agencies and
their input, the Bureau sought to craft Adjudication Rules that are
both fair and efficient. The Bureau recognizes, however, that its work
will always benefit from the informed views of interested parties
SEC and CFPB rules require the hearing officer to request an extension at least thirty days
before expiration of the applicable time period, allow the parties to file briefs supporting
or opposing the extension, and authorize the Commission or the Director, respectively, to
grant the extension only if "additional time is necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est." 12 C.F.R. § 1081.400(b) (CFPB rule); 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a) (3) (SEC rule). Both the
CFPB and the SEC rules provide that parties' requests for extensions of deadlines are
'strongly disfavor[ed]." 12 C.F.R. § 1081.115(b) (CFPB rule); 17 C.F.R. § 201.161(b)(1)
(SEC rule). The CFPB's rules adopt the SEC's rules requiring the requesting party to
make a "strong showing that the denial of the request or motion would substantially
prejudice their case" and identify five enumerated factors for the agency to consider in
evaluating the request. 12 C.F.R. § 1081.115(b); 17 C.F.R. § 201.161(b)(1).
163 Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,350. Compare 12
C.F.R. § 1081.400(a) (CFPB rule providing that "the hearing officer shall file a recom-
mended decision no later than 90 days after the deadline for filing post-hearing responsive
briefs"), with 16 C.F.R. § 3.51(a) (2011) (FTC rule providing that "[t]he Administrative
Law Judge shall file an initial decision within 70 days after the filing of the last filed initial
or reply proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order pursuant to [16 C.F.R.]
§ 3.46, within 85 days of the closing the hearing record pursuant to [16 C.F.R.] § 3.44(c)
where the parties have waived the filing of proposed findings, or within 14 days after the
granting of a motion for summary decision following a referral of such motion from the
Commission").
164 Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,338, 45,350; 12
C.F.R. § 1081.203.
165 12 C.F.R. § 1081.203(a).
166 Rules of Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738, 32,741 (June 23, 1995).
167 Id.
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outside of the government. Therefore, it requested and has received
public comment on its Adjudication Rules and has carefully consid-
ered commenters' suggestions in drafting improved final rules.168
CONCLUSION
Congress created the Bureau to act as a twenty-first-century regu-
lator that would promote a well-functioning market for consumer fi-
nancial services and effective consumer protection. As the recent
financial crisis illustrated, the stakes attached to accomplishing this
mission are high, and the task is clearly formidable. The CFPB appre-
ciates the significant scope and depth of this mandate. The Bureau
has sought to meet this challenge by making policy decisions in light
of the following four principles: (1) a market-based approach; (2) a
focus on evidence-based analysis; (3) a commitment to encouraging
and enabling robust public participation through transparency and
innovative uses of technology; and (4) a recognition that history and
other agencies' experience can provide invaluable guidance. This Ar-
ticle described, with several concrete examples, how these principles
informed important Bureau decisions during the first eighteen
months since Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act. The Bureau in-
tends to abide by these principles as it continues its work to foster fair,
transparent, and competitive markets for consumer financial products
and services and to empower consumers to take more control of their
financial lives.
168 See Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. at 45,338.
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